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Potential software failures present a sizable risk element
in the design and development of many systems. In this
paper, we augment the Software Function-Failure Design
method, which is capable of predicting potential software
failures in the very early stages of design, with the Risk
in Early Design technique. This synergistic combination
allows a risk assessment to be conducted at an early time
in the software development process when traditional tech-
niques are not applicable. The results are concise risk state-
ments regarding the potential failure of functionalities with
likelihood and consequence quantifications that can be used
as part of a risk management program. The process is illus-
trated using a software failure database for the NASA Mars
Exploratory Rover.
1. Introduction and motivation
The potential for software failures presents a sizable risk
element in any software-intensive system. Where long-term
planning, complex designs, autonomous control, and ex-
pensive hardware are tightly integrated—as in the NASA
Mars missions—a single software failure can cause the loss
of a $328 million project. In the case of manned missions,
the loss can be incalculable.
Software failures present an increasing proportion of
risk. The reliability of design and manufacture for me-
chanical and electromechanical components has increased
to such a level that software now constitutes the plurality
of failures in many hardware-software hybrid systems—
33.9% in the case of one NASA Spacecraft [11].
For these reasons, it is critical to incorporate risk analysis
into every aspect of the design, implementation, and execu-















Figure 1. Schematic Overview of Using FFDM
and RED to Assess Software Risk
and software-hardware hybrid systems, risk analysis is ben-
eficial and often necessary even for corporate endeavors and
smaller scale projects. Not only must risk be ascertained,
but steps must be taken to prevent or identify potential fail-
ures in software.
This paper introduces SRED (Software Risk in Early De-
sign), a method to be applied early in the software design
process to identify and analyze the risk presented by poten-
tial software failures. SRED is built upon previous efforts
to transform the Function-Failure Design Method [15, 16]
from an electromechanical design domain to the software
design domain. With the Software Function-Failure Design
Method developed, this paper adapts and demonstrates the
corresponding Risk in Early Design (RED) method [3,4] to
the software domain, to provide a software risk assessment
technique based upon functionality—often the only infor-
mation available in the very early design stages. Software
functionality is used with historical function-failure data to
generate potential failures via SWFFDM. These potential
failures are combined with historical failure severity infor-
mation to generate a software risk assessment via SRED, as
illustrated in Figure 1.
SRED allows the early assessment of risk, which can
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guide future, more-detailed risk assessment techniques,
provide a test-case development guide, and assist in mak-
ing the decision on whether or not a software product has
been tested enough to be safely released. By leveraging
the advantages of the Function-Failure Design Method and
Risk in Early Design, SRED eliminates many shortcomings
of applying traditional engineering-based risk assessment
techniques (e.g., FMEA) to the early design stages of soft-
ware development (Section 2.1). Furthermore, SRED is ap-
plicable in the early stages of design, allowing the applica-
tion of continuous risk management at a time when tradi-
tional techniques cannot be successfully applied.
This paper proceeds by describing current software risk
assessment techniques, the background and application
of the Function-Failure Design Method (FFDM) to soft-
ware, and an overview of the Risk in Early Design (RED)
method for FFDM in the Related work section. Next, Sec-
tion 3 illustrates the development of RED into SRED us-
ing the NASA Mars Exploratory Rover as an example of
its application to the software development process. Sec-
tion 4 demonstrates how the risk assessment provided by
SRED can be used to control risk using the analysis as a
decision-making tool when releasing a tested software prod-
uct. Finally, concluding remarks and future work are dis-
cussed in Section 5.
2. Related work
2.1. Current software risk assessment tech-
niques
Due to the complex and often critical nature of soft-
ware in many systems—from nuclear reactors to consumer
products—many techniques for risk assessment and anal-
ysis have been inspired by or adapted from the more de-
veloped engineering domain [10]. Chiefly among them
is the Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis
(FMECA/FMEA), developed by the aerospace and automo-
tive industries [10]. FMEA is a bottom-up approach to iden-
tify potential failures in a product, assess their hazard, and
identify mitigation steps. From these assessments, a risk
number is determined for each potential failure.
FMEA has been applied to software (leading to SFMEA)
as early as 1983 [2]. SFMEA is frequently combined with
Fault-Tree Analysis and has been performed successfully
on a wide range of systems, including spacecraft flight soft-
ware. SFMEA is the de facto method of risk assessment for
software [1, 7, 8].
Despite its importance and wide use, SFMEA is subject
to several shortcomings. To be meaningful, a SFMEA must
be performed late in the design cycle when the software
product is available to be examined in detail. This limits its
usefulness in early design when a risk assessment can have
the most impact with the least penalty for change [2,8]. Be-
cause the assessment is manual and dependent on soliciting
assessments from experts, a team of engineers intimately fa-
miliar with the design and implementation of the software
must gather to perform the tedious task of producing the
subjective risk assessment [8]. Pentti, in conducting an ex-
tensive literature survey on the suitability of SFMEA, con-
cludes that, “A common opinion is that FMEA is applicable
to software-based systems only to a limited extent” [10].
Many other methods exist for assessing risk and discov-
ering latent software failures in the early and late stages of
design as well as during development. Sophisticated tech-
niques assess requirements completeness, perform static
code analysis, aggregate software metrics, or even formally
prove correctness [6]. Each of these methods provides a de-
tailed analysis of risk or correctness using a level of design
detail not always available in the earliest stages. Some, such
as SFMEA can be stimulated with the results of SWFFDM.
2.2. The Software Function-Failure Design
Method
A clear need exists to incorporate risk assessment as
early in the development process as possible. The early
availability of risk information allows improvements to be
made to the design at a stage when the penalty for change
is minimal. This is true both for mechanical and software
based systems and was a driving realization for the develop-
ment of the Function-Failure Design Method for electrome-
chanical systems [15, 16]. Prior work by the authors has
adapted the FFDM to software.
In the Software Function-Failure Design Method
(SWFFDM), historically observed failures of software are
classified by a failure mode taxonomy and catalogued by the
functionality provided by the failed software module. This
catalog links failure to functionality through components.
Components may be software modules, libraries, or other
separately identifiable implementations of software. When
a new software product is designed, its intended functional-
ity can be used to generate a set of potential failures. This
process is automatic and can be carried out by a novice soft-
ware developer with only top-level knowledge of the func-
tionality of the product under analysis. Because SWFFDM
is based on historical data, it is not dependent upon the de-
veloper to think of all the possible failure modes in order to
produce results.
The key components of the FFDM are the functional-
ity taxonomy, the failure-mode taxonomy, and the failure
knowledge-base, which takes the form of a matrix. In or-
der to populate this matrix, the functionality taxonomy is
used to capture the functionality provided by components
in a consistent manner. This is captured in a Function-
Component (EC) matrix that correlates functionality to
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specific implementations. Next, the failure-mode taxonomy
is used to consistently capture observed failures and cor-
relate them to the specific, failed implementations. This
is termed a Component-Failure (CF) matrix. These two
matrices are multiplied together to yield a Function-Failure
(EF) matrix, which correlates failure modes with function-
ality and comprises the failure knowledge-base. This is ex-




1 Where component i has been used
to provide functionality k.
0 Otherwise
CFi,j = n, where component i has experienced
n failures of type j.
EFk,j = p, where functionality k is associated
p times with failure mode j.
(1)
Potential failure modes can be identified for a new
project by consulting the failure knowledge-base repre-
sented in the EF matrix. Functionality is represented in
rows, while failure modes are represented in columns. Since
failure is related to functionality through components by
matrix multiplication (Equation (1)), the failure knowledge-
base contains predictions of failure for functionality based
upon historically observed failures of components with sim-
ilar functionality.
2.3. The Risk in Early Design (RED)
method
While the SWFFDM provides a list of potential failures
of functionality present in a design, it does not provide any
information about risk. The only way to differentiate among
generated failure modes is by relative frequency of observa-
tion. To be truly useful, risk information must be associated
with each potential failure to determine the relative amount
of effort to be expended on discovering, preventing, or han-
dling the given potential failures. For this reason, the Risk
in Early Design (RED) method was developed [3, 4].
RED seeks to effectively communicate risk elements
during the early stages of design—where the greatest op-
portunity for risk mitigation occurs. Furthermore, RED
seeks to accomplish this without the need for a team of ex-
perts, the tedium, nor the subjectivity of language, which
are present in many risk assessment techniques. In order
to accomplish this, RED leverages FFDM to generate po-
tential failures but augments the results with likelihood and
consequence data. These two additional pieces of informa-
tion, combined with their associated failure of functionality,
constitute a risk element which conveys what Rosenberg, et
al. term a risk statement, concisely communicating what
can fail, how severe the failure would be, and a relative
strength of potential for observing the failure [4, 13].
2.3.1 Likelihood and consequence mappings
Likelihood data is determined in relation to other poten-
tial failures from the Function-Failure matrix. Consequence
data is determined from the addition of a CF′ matrix. This
matrix contains failure severity entries from a severity rat-
ing on a scale of increasing severity from 1–5. This scale
is divided such that a severity entry of 1 implies the failure
is relatively unnoticed by the casual observer and a severity
entry of 5 implies a safety risk. For entries in CF′ where
no failure is recorded, the value 0 is used [4].
RED provides two methods for calculating likelihood
(L1-prod and L2) and two methods for calculating sever-
ity (C1 and C2) [4]. L1-prod provides a likelihood mapping
which normalizes the likelihood of a failure to a scale of in-
creasing likelihood of 0–5 based on the maximum value of
entries in a subset of the EF matrix containing only func-
tionality found in the product under analysis:
EFrelevant = EFk,j∀ k ∈ {product functionality}. (2)
The L2 mapping provides the same normalization scale but
normalizes against the maximum value of all entries in the
EF matrix. Equation (3) provides the formulation, which
depends on a specialized rounding function, int, that rounds
half-up normally but rounds non-zero numbers less than 1











The two consequence mappings similarly produce con-
sequence values for each function-failure entry. The C1
mapping provides a conservative estimate of consequence
by returning the maximum severity of a failure for a given
functionality. Alternatively, the C2 mapping provides an
augmented average severity among observed failures for a
given functionality. The mappings are given in Equation
(4) for C1 and Equation (5) for C2. The formulation for C2
depends on a value h, which represents the relevant num-
ber of function-failure combinations for that function (i.e.,
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2.3.2 Choosing the appropriate mapping combination
Each combination of likelihood and consequence mappings
serves a specific purpose. The L1-prod likelihood mapping
provides a conservative estimate of risk but it can provide
overly-high likelihood projections that may not be fully sup-
ported by the data. The L2 mapping avoids this but can
downplay underrepresented failures. The C1 consequence
mapping provides a conservative severity estimate but can
be dominated by a single severe occurrence. The C2 con-
sequence mapping reduces the domination of a single high-
severity occurrence without diluting the average, but it is
more sensitive to the specific combinations of failures and
severities recorded in the database [3].
These combinations give rise to a heuristic for selecting
a consequence and likelihood mapping: Because of the con-
servative estimate of C1, it is better suited when the prod-
uct involves human safety. If human safety is not a factor,
C2 often provides a more realistic assessment of risk. For
system-level design situations, the L2 likelihood mapping is
most applicable since it is normalized against a wider range
of failures. L1 is more suited for subsystem design situa-
tions due to the more limited scope of normalization [3].
2.3.3 Using likelihood and consequence mappings
After selecting the appropriate combination of mappings,
the data is summarized through the use of a fever chart. A
fever chart is a 5-by-5 matrix that shows consequence on
the horizontal axis and likelihood on the vertical axis. Each
cell of the matrix displays the number of elements falling
into that consequence-likelihood combination. The chart is
color-coded such that the lower-left area is green to indicate
low risk, the middle area is yellow to indicate moderate risk,
and the upper-right area is red to indicate high risk [9]. Ex-
ample fever charts can be seen in Section 3.3.
The fever chart is populated with the failure data pro-
duced by the FFDM procedure, plotted according to the as-
sociated values for the consequence and likelihood—taken
from their appropriate mapping matrices. This combina-
tion of information provides an effective means of com-
municating identifiable risk elements. A risk statement is
composed of the design parameter that fails (the functional-
ity), the manner in which it may fail (the failure mode), the
likelihood of failure, and the consequence. Using this infor-
mation, potential failures can easily be divided among low,
moderate, and high risks without introducing undue subjec-
tivity.
2.4. Continuous risk management
Rosenberg, et al. present a model of continuous risk
management in use at NASA’s Software Assurance Tech-
nology Center (SATC). This model provides a circular, six-
step continuous model for managing risk, beginning with
identification. In this first step uncertainties are transformed
into describable, distinct risks. In the second step, analyze,
risk information is converted into decision-making informa-
tion. Next, the planning step provides an opportunity to set
actions in response to risk decisions. Step four provides
for tracking, in step five tracking information is acted upon
to control risk, while the final step is to communicate and
document risk and mitigation for future access and aware-
ness [13].
We will continue by stepping through the SRED process
on an example project. At each step, we will discuss how
SRED can be used as part of a continuous risk management
model to provide early identification of risk elements. This
early identification will then be used to analyze the risk in-
formation such that planning can be carried out in an in-
formed state. We will also see how SRED contributes to
risk tracking, control, and communication.
3. Developing SRED: Using the RED method
with software
A model of the functionality for the software under as-
sessment is used to identify potential failures via SWFFDM.
Each potential failure is then fed into SRED to compute
consequence and likelihood values. Thus, quantifiable, dis-
tinct risk statements are generated, which can be used for
further analysis, as discussed in later sections.
The example project used to illustrate the adaptation of
RED to software and for the use of SRED is the NASA
Mars Exploratory Rover (MER). This mission had many
software and software-hardware hybrid components. The
relevant modules we will be focusing on are the star scan-
ner orientation system, the robotic instrument arm for the
Mars rovers, and the cruise stage craft itself. The star scan-
ner data is actually comprised of several implementations
of the star scanner module over many missions. The robotic
arm (Instrument Deployment Device) holds several scien-
tific instruments with specific software to drive their opera-
tion. The cruise stage craft (referred to as the vehicle in this
paper) contains flight software originally developed for the
Mars PathFinder mission. The software was reused in the
Deep Space One mission and ultimately modified for use
with MER.
The actual software was unavailable for examination;
however a set of previously collected Problem and Failure
Reports (PFRs) spanning several projects over several years
31st Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference(COMPSAC 2007)
0-7695-2870-8/07 $25.00  © 2007
were available. The Problem and Failure Reporting sys-
tem is maintained by NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory and
contains actual failure data for unmanned spacecraft. Over
300 missions are represented, though only a small fraction
of the reports were available to the authors [12]. From this
limited set, software failures were extracted and identified
as being part of a star scanner, the MER robotic instrument
arm, or the MER vehicle. The data set is limited and incom-
plete, though it is enough to serve as an illustration of the
SRED development and application process.
These software-related PFRs were used to develop a
high-level software functionality taxonomy for embedded
software. This was combined with a software failure taxon-
omy developed by Li, Smidts, et al. [6, 14] that was found
to be applicable as mentioned in Section 2.2.
3.1. Constructing a function-failure
knowledge-base
The key to the success of traditional FFDM, RED, and
SRED alike is a quality failure knowledge-base as explained
in Section 2. The quality of the predictions made are di-
rectly linked to the quality of captured historical failure
data. The initial requirement of SRED is for a failure
knowledge-base to be available.
Due to the incompleteness and availability of data, the
PFRs for the star scanner and robotic arm system were used
to develop the knowledge base, while the PFRs for the MER
vehicle were set aside and will be used later as the exam-
ple system under development to be analyzed using SRED.
This allows the analysis provided by SRED to be compared
with actual, discovered errors and for the illustration of its
application to various stages of development. The PFRs are
distributed among the three systems: Robotic Arm (4), Star
Scanner (24), and MER Vehicle (11).
Each software PFR for the robotic arm and star scan-
ner was manually examined to extract the failure and clas-
sify it in the failure mode taxonomy using the available de-
scription of what the error was and how it was ameliorated.
Similarly, the functionality was determined using the same
descriptions, classified, and combined to build up a failure
knowledge base by filling in EC and CF matrices to arrive
at an EF matrix as described in Equation (1). Furthermore,
each PFR also records a failure severity as determined by
the discovering engineer. This severity is used to develop a
CF′ matrix as described in Section 2.3.1.
The development of these failure and severity
knowledge-bases is a necessary precondition for per-
forming the risk analysis. Though it is the prerequisite
step in the process, it is actually part of the last step of
communication and documentation in the risk management
model presented by Rosenberg, et al. As failures are
encountered, part of the tracking step is to incorporate them
into a repository that can be used to manage risk.
3.2. Performing an early risk evaluation:
Identifying risk
The EC and CF matrices, their product (the EF ma-
trix), and the CF′ matrix, created using PFR data from
the robotic arm and star scanner, are shown in Figures 2–5.
These represent our repository of failure information based
upon historic observations (or expert opinion in the case of
severity) and will be used to analyze the MER vehicle de-
sign.
Supposing the MER vehicle software is in the early
stages of development, only the desired functionality will
be known. For SRED this functionality is expressed in the
software functionality taxonomy but can be extracted from
existing requirements documents. Due to the comparatively
homogenous and abstract nature of available data, the de-
sired functionality for the MER vehicle software is identical
to the set of functionalities for which failures have been cap-
tured and corresponds to the rows of the EF matrix (Figure
4).
For our test example of the MER vehicle, we now have a
set of potential failures based on the intended functionality
as represented in Figure 4. Reading the first line of the ma-
trix indicates that Analyze Linear Data can possibly fail by
incorrect attribute realization, de-synchronization, environ-
ment induced failure, etc. Each of these failure modes has
a specific meaning detailed in other work [6, 14]. Reading
down the rows gives similar failures for other functionali-
ties. The number in the corresponding cells indicates the
relative support of the historical data for the potential of the
given functionality failing by the given mode.
At this point, we have identified only what can fail and
how through SWFFDM; we have not identified any risk.
The next step in the SRED process is to apply RED where
SWFFDM left off. Using the formulations provided in
Equations (3) through (5), we can attach likelihood and con-
sequence data to our potential failures and arrive at identifi-
able risks.
The likelihood mapping for the MER vehicle is given
in Figure 6 according to Equation (3). Due to the limited
amount of data, L1 and L2 are identical: the maximum entry
in the complete EF matrix is the same as the maximum en-
try in the filtered matrix. Ordinarily, an L1 mapping would
be most appropriate as the MER vehicle is a subsystem of a
larger system.
Similarly, a consequence mapping is created according
to Equation (4) or (5). Because the MER vehicle is un-
manned, the less-conservative C2 mapping (Figure 7) is
more appropriate. With these three elements (EF, L1, C2)
combined, risk items have been identified and quantified. A
risk statement can be constructed by matching the data from
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Analyze Linear Data 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
Analyze Scenes 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Approximate Solutions 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
Control Analog Device 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
Control Digital Device 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
Generate Graphics 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Manage Hardware 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Manage Processes 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
Manage Reliability 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
Perform Arithmetic Calculations 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
Read or Write Data 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Figure 2. Star Scanner and Robotic Arm
Function-Component (EC) Matrix

















Attitude Control 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Attitude Control Interface 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Microimager Camera Interface 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Operating System 1 2 1 0 1 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 0
Panoramic Camera Interface 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Radar Altimeter 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Star Scanner Analyzer 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 1
Star Scanner System 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
X-Ray Spectrometer System 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Figure 3. Star Scanner and Robotic Arm
Component-Failure (CF) Matrix
















Analyze Linear Data 1 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 2
Analyze Scenes 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 1
Approximate Solutions 1 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 2
Control Analog Device 1 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 1
Control Digital Device 2 4 2 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 0 0 2
Generate Graphics 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Manage Hardware 2 3 1 0 1 0 3 2 0 1 0 0 0
Manage Processes 1 3 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 1
Manage Reliability 1 3 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 2
Perform Arithmetic Calculations 2 4 2 1 2 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 3
Read or Write Data 3 5 2 1 2 1 5 2 1 1 1 1 3
Figure 4. Star Scanner and Robotic Arm
Function-Failure (EF) Matrix
each entry and is more readily communicated if listed out.
3.3. Analyzing risk
With risk statements created for the MER vehicle, we
move on to the task of analyzing the risk data to convert it
into a decision-making guide. At this stage, 95 individual
risk statements are available, ranging from the practically
inconsequential to the severe. Some items must be given
priority consideration over others.
To accomplish this task, we employ the concept of
a fever chart as mentioned in Section 2.3.3. A fever
chart allows the 95 risk statements to be condensed into
low, medium, and high risk segments. This is done
by simply plotting each risk statement according to the
(consequence, likelihood) coordinates given by the C and
L matrices. This has been done to produce the fever charts
shown in Figure 8 for the C2 mapping. For illustrative pur-
poses, the more conservative C1 fever chart is also shown
in Figure 9.
The fever chart in Figure 8 shows that a majority of the
potential failures fall into the low-risk zone, a few are in
the moderate-risk zone, and none are in the high-risk zone.
Visually, the chart conveys that while a few moderate-risk
failures are predicted, the overall risk is low. This chart ef-
fectively communicates that Control Digital Device failing
due to Overload (1, 1) is not as risky as the potential for
Control Digital Device failing due to De-Synchronization
(3, 4).
RED provides another means of conveying overall risk.
The center of risk (r) can be computed as the weighted av-
erage of the consequence and likelihood. This is analogous
to calculating the center of mass for a fever chart [4].
3.4. Applying the risk analysis: Planning
Because the MER vehicle shows a very low center of risk
(r(C2L1) = (1.56, 1.60)), it may be appropriate to accept
many of the risks as presented while making some plans to
mitigate the moderate risks. Because of the quality of this
illustrative failure knowledge-base, low risk potential fail-
ures should not be discounted: while there is little evidence
to support counting them as significant risks, there is also
little evidence to support discounting their risk. Ideally, the
failure knowledge-base would draw on a wider range and
depth of historical failures.
One clear mitigation practice that can be guided by the
SRED results is simply to create test cases that are sure to
discover failures in the indicated functionalities. For exam-
ple, the moderate risk presented by the functionality Con-
trol Digital Device failing due to De-Synchronization (3, 4)
could be mitigated by ensuring that test cases for MER ve-
hicle modules that participate in controlling a digital device
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Attitude Control 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Attitude Control Interface 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Microimager Camera Interface 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Operating System 1 3 2 0 1 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 0
Panoramic Camera Interface 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Radar Altimeter 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Star Scanner Analyzer 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 1
Star Scanner System 0 2 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2
X-Ray Spectrometer System 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Figure 5. Star Scanner and Robotic Arm
Component-Failure Severity (CF′) Matrix
















Analyze Linear Data 1 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 2
Analyze Scenes 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 1
Approximate Solutions 1 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 2
Control Analog Device 1 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 1
Control Digital Device 2 4 2 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 0 0 2
Generate Graphics 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Manage Hardware 2 3 1 0 1 0 3 2 0 1 0 0 0
Manage Processes 1 3 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 1
Manage Reliability 1 3 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 2
Perform Arithmetic Calculations 2 4 2 1 2 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 3
Read or Write Data 3 5 2 1 2 1 5 2 1 1 1 1 3
Figure 6. MER Vehicle Likelihood (L1/L2)
Mapping
















Analyze Linear Data 2 1 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 1
Analyze Scenes 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 1
Approximate Solutions 2 1 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 1
Control Analog Device 2 1 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 1 2 1
Control Digital Device 2 2 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 2
Generate Graphics 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Manage Hardware 2 2 2 0 1 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 0
Manage Processes 1 3 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 2
Manage Reliability 1 3 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 2
Perform Arithmetic Calculations 2 2 3 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1
Read or Write Data 2 2 3 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1
Figure 7. MER Vehicle Consequence (C2)
Mapping
5 0 2 0 0 0
4 0 3 0 0 0
3 2 4 2 0 0
2 5 13 5 0 0
1 42 15 1 0 0











Chart for the C2L1
Mapping
5 0 1 1 0 0
4 0 1 2 0 0
3 0 4 4 0 0
2 5 11 7 0 0
1 42 15 1 0 0











Chart for the C1L1
Mapping
include specific tests for their synchronization with other
processes or threads. This also improves the traceability of
the project if test cases are tied to requirements through the
risk analysis.
Depending both on the criticality of the software project
and the center of risk presented by the SRED analysis, it
may be beneficial to plan to perform a more detailed Prob-
abilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) such as SFMEA. Gener-
ally performing a PRA requires generating a set of initiating
events to transform into risk profiles. Clearly SRED can be
of assistance by providing a set of potential risks that can
be added to or subtracted from by a team of experts [3, 4].
With an established failure knowledge-base and functional
description of the software project, the SRED analysis could
be generated by a novice in a matter of minutes. Not only
does this reduce tedium and speed such detailed PRA pro-
cesses along, it also allows the experts to focus on the details
of the analysis and the generation of mitigation recommen-
dations.
4. Using RED to make the decision to release:
Tracking and controlling risk
Moving along in our illustration of how SRED can be ap-
plied to the continuous risk management process, we arrive
at the late stages of software development when testing is
being conducted. After some amount of testing, either due
to schedule constraints or other forces, the decision must be
made of whether or not the software is ready to be released.
This decision ought to be made with as much information
on risk as possible.
Recalling the discussion of PFRs from Section 3.1 there
were eleven software failures actually discovered during
rigorous testing of the MER vehicle. If each of these
failure discoveries were tracked in conjunction with the
SRED analysis, we could continuously update the risk as-
sessment by removing them from the list of potential fail-
ures once they are fixed. This would provide a dynamic
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assessment that could be used to control exposure to risk.
A common technique used to assess risk at the end of
development is error trending, which plots the cumulative
number of errors discovered versus the cumulative number
of days of testing. From this plot, various trending models
can be fit to the data to predict the total number of errors
present in the software. The designers can then determine
how many errors remain to be discovered as well as how
long their discovery may take. This information can be used
to determine if the amount of risk associated with releas-
ing the software with a few undiscovered errors is accept-
able [5]. SRED can be used to augment this technique by
providing more information about the risk associated with
the remaining software errors.
5. Concluding Remarks
Widely used risk assessment and mitigation techniques
such as static code analysis, software metric aggregation,
and SFMEA provide an important, detailed assessment of
risk in software projects when projects have progressed to
the implementation stages and enough data is available to
perform these analyses. To be truly effective, however,
methods must be applied which incorporate awareness of
risk in all stages of development. The early analysis and
design stages present the unique opportunity to affect risk
when changes can be made with the least impact to budget
and schedule.
To fulfill the need for an easily applied risk assessment
technique that can be used in the early stages of design—
when detailed analysis cannot be carried out—the Software
Function-Failure Design Method was augmented through
the application of the Risk in Early Design technique. This
paper has shown how RED was applied to the software
domain to create SRED. NASA’s Mars Exploratory Rover
served as an example to illustrate how SRED can be incor-
porated as part of a continuous risk management program.
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